POWER OR PRUDENCE: WHICH IS IT?
Lisa A. Dolak†
INTRODUCTION
In limiting patent litigants’ access to the declaratory judgment remedy, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has primarily invoked the “actual controversy”
requirement imposed by the U.S. Constitution and the federal Declaratory Judgment Act
(the “Act”). However, an examination of Federal Circuit decisions and those of the
district courts reveals that the courts have often confused, or blurred the distinction
between, constitutional requirements and the discretion the Act affords the federal courts
to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Specifically, the courts often attribute constitutional
significance to factors that instead bear on policy.
The role that policy plays in patent declaratory justiciability determinations is at
issue in two cases currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,1 the Solicitor General has criticized the Federal
Circuit for its reliance on patent policy in deciding justiciability.2 And the Petitioner in
Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer Inc.3 accuses the court of “elevat[ing] that court’s prudential
jurisdictional doctrine (the ‘reasonable apprehension’ requirement) to a ‘constitutional
requirement.’”4 But, as discussed herein, the Federal Circuit’s intermingling of
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427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 1329 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2006) (No.
05-608).
2

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23, MedImmune,
427 F.3d 958 (No. 05-608) (“Considerations of patent policy . . . could not justify
creation of a patent-specific test that is more rigorous than the constitutional and statutory
standards that determine the existence of a justiciable case or controversy in all other
contexts.”).
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Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 159 F. App’x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed,
126 S. Ct. 2057 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2006) (No. 05-1006).

4

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-9, Apotex, 159 F. App’x 1013 (No. 05-1006).

jurisdiction (i.e., the constitutional and statutory authority to hear cases) and policy is not
confined to these two cases.
It is important to distinguish between jurisdictional limits and policy
considerations when deciding justiciability issues in patent cases. Misapplication of the
law, or even mere imprecision in the allocation of jurisdictional and prudential
considerations, engenders confusion among the affected parties – litigants and potential
litigants – who then bear the costs of this confusion in the form of uncertainty, higher
litigation expenses, and forgone opportunities. Furthermore, when the courts are
attentive to the distinction between the jurisdictional and prudential bases for
justiciability decisions, they are more likely to carefully evaluate the policy implications
of those determinations. Litigants, in turn, will be motivated to provide courts with more
careful analysis. The likely results include the development of better policy and
improved judicial decision-making.
This paper discusses the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the justiciability of
declaratory judgment claims in patent cases. Part I explains the jurisdictional and
discretionary standards the courts apply in determining whether to adjudicate declaratory
judgment claims. It further describes how the Federal Circuit has generally applied the
applicable jurisdictional standards restrictively. Part II illustrates that the courts have
often decided cases on jurisdictional grounds when the underlying facts have principally
or exclusively prudential significance. Part III attempts to explain the courts’ tendency to
decide justiciability on jurisdictional as opposed to discretionary grounds. It further
contends that negative jurisprudential and practical consequences flow from this
tendency, among them, a continuing disregard of the policies underlying the Declaratory
Judgment Act, a failure to tailor the availability of declaratory judgment relief to the
particular circumstances of the cases, a lack of thoughtful analysis regarding the
consequences to the litigants of justiciability decisions, and the resulting detrimental
effects on the vitality of the United States patent system. Part III further contends that by
focusing appropriately on prudential, or policy, considerations in justiciability
determinations in patent cases, courts can reduce the incidence of inconsistent decisions,
lessen confusion among litigants, encourage more thoughtful advocacy, and deliver better
decisions.
I.

THE CHALLENGE FOR THE PATENT CHALLENGER

A patent infringement defendant typically asserts one or more declaratory
judgment counterclaims in response to the patentee’s claim(s) for patent infringement.
Most commonly, infringement defendants request judgment on the ground that the patent
at issue is invalid,5 unenforceable,6 and/or not infringed.7
5

See, e.g., Biocore, AB v. Thermo Bioanalysis Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 422, 426 (D. Del.
1999) (noting that the infringement defendant pled invalidity and noninfringement
counterclaims). Invalidity results from the failure of the patent to meet one or more
statutory requirements, including, for example, the requirements that: (1) the claims
2

Alternatively, a patent challenger may, in appropriate circumstances,8 institute
patent litigation in federal court9 by filing a complaint requesting a declaration of patent
invalidity, unenforceability, or noninfringement.10 Congress’ desire to alleviate the
recite novel (35 U.S.C. §102) and nonobvious (35 U.S.C. §103) subject matter; (2) the
specification enable, provide a written description for, and disclose the best mode (if
there is one) of practicing the claimed invention (35 U.S.C. § 112); and (3) the claims
“particularly point out and distinctly claim” the subject invention (35 U.S.C. §112). 35
U.S.C. §§ 102-03, 112 (2002).
6

See, e.g., Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Pharmadyne Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268-71 (D.
Md. 1998) (introducing findings of fact and conclusions of law in a patent infringement
case in which the infringement defendants sought a declaratory judgment that the
plaintiff's patents were invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed). A patent may be
declared unenforceable based, for example, on the applicant's inequitable conduct during
procurement. See, e.g., Elk Corp. v. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp., 168 F.3d 28, 32 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (affirming determination of inequitable conduct based on applicant's failure to
disclose its own prior art patent and reference located in patentability search).
7

See, e.g., Evans Med. Ltd. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 980 F. Supp. 132, 138 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (dismissing defendants' declaratory judgment counterclaims based on allegations
that the asserted patents were invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed). See 35 U.S.C. §
271(a) (2003) (“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent”).
8

See infra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.

9

The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent laws.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). According to the Federal Circuit, “[a]n action seeking
declaration of patent invalidity arises under the patent law, . . . as do actions seeking
declaration of infringement, . . . and declaration of noninfringement.” Genentech, Inc. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 943 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing EDWIN BORCHARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 808 (2d ed. 1941)).
10

“Declaratory judgment actions in the patent area are most commonly brought by
potential infringers against patentees seeking a declaration of noninfringement or
invalidity or both.” 10A Charles A. Wright et. al. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2761, at 671 n.4 (2d ed. 1983) (cited in Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761,
763 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). See, e.g., Minds-Eye-View, Inc. v. Interactive Pictures Corp., 58
F. Supp. 2d 5, 10 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (granting defendant-patentee's motion to dismiss
alleged infringers' declaratory judgment invalidity claim); Epling v. Golden
Eagle/Satellite Archery, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 207, 211 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying
defendant-patentee's motion to dismiss or stay competitor's action seeking a declaratory
judgment of noninfringement); CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Beloit Corp., 957 F. Supp. 784,
3

uncertainty faced by parties, such as alleged patent infringers, who previously lacked a
cause of action, and were, therefore, unable to secure judicial determination of their
rights, was a primary motivating force behind the federal Declaratory Judgment Act (the
“Act”).11
790 (E.D. Va. 1997) (denying plaintiff-putative infringer's motion to compel discovery
from defendant-patentee in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's claim for a declaration that the patent was invalid, unenforceable, and not
infringed).
11

Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955. The legislative history from 1934
Congressional session is very limited because there were no debates in either the House
or the Senate on the bill that year. See 78 CONG. REC. 10,564-65, 10,919 (1934) (Senate
consideration); 78 CONG. REC. 8224 (1934) (House consideration). However, a bill
proposing a federal declaratory judgment remedy had been introduced in every
Congressional session from 1919 to 1932, and the corresponding hearings demonstrate
that the primary purpose of the statute was to eliminate uncertainty. See, e.g., 1928
Hearings of H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1928) [hereinafter “1928 Senate Hearings”] (testimony of
Professor Edson R. Sunderland, whose 1917 law review article (Edson R. Sunderland, A
Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights – The Declaratory Judgment, 16 MICH. L. REV. 69
(1917)) was instrumental in instituting the effort to pass a federal declaratory judgment
statute in the United States, contending that, without the declaratory judgment remedy,
parties must undergo great risks without knowledge of the respective entitlements, and
concluding that the declaratory judgment “removes all that peril”); 1928 Senate
Hearings, supra at 16 (letter from Judge Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York
State Court of Appeals, describing the remedy as “a useful expedient to litigants who
would otherwise have acted at their peril, or at best would have been exposed to
harrowing delay.”); Hearing on H.R. 10143 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1922) [hereinafter “1922 House Hearings”] (statement of Rep.
Summers) (the purpose of the declaratory judgment statute is “[t]o remove uncertainty. It
seems to me the individual citizen has as much right to be reasonably certain as to what
the courts would determine his right to be as he has to be reasonably certain what the
legislature has determined his rights to be.”).
In his Senate testimony, Professor Sunderland described the plight of the alleged patent
infringer, as follows:
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You
claim that you have a patent. What am I going to do about
it? There is no way I can litigate my right, which I claim,
to use that device, except by going ahead and using it, and
you [the patent holder] can sit back as long as you please
and let me run up just as high a bill of damages as you wish
to have me run up, and then you may sue me for the
damages, and I am ruined, having acted all the time in good
4

The Act’s sole requisite for jurisdiction is the presence of an “actual
controversy.”12 To qualify for adjudication pursuant to the Act, a dispute must satisfy the
constitutional “case or controversy” requirement.13 However, while the existence of
declaratory judgment jurisdiction is an either-or proposition, many cases do not
definitively fit into one category or the other.14 To assist their justiciability evaluations,

faith and on my best judgment, but having no way in the
world to find out whether I had a right to use that device or
not.
1928 Senate Hearings, at 35.
12

The Declaratory Judgment Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2201. It provides, in relevant
part:
Creation of remedy
(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,
. . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
Id.
13

See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937) (interpreting the
Act's application in an action brought by an insurance company against its insured and
his beneficiary). See also Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g
Co., 655 F.2d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that the Act's actual controversy
requirement “is the same as the 'case or controversy' requirement of Article III of the
United States Constitution”); Precision Shooting Equip. Co. v. Allen, 646 F.2d 313, 314
n.4 (7th Cir. 1981) (observing that “[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act . . . limits declaratory
judgments to actual controversies in conformity with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution”).
14

See BP Chem. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting
that the difference between an actual controversy and a situation not ripe for adjudication
“'is necessarily one of degree' . . . and is determined on the totality of the circumstances”)
(quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). See also
Precision Shooting, 646 F.2d at 316 (stating that “the application of the general
'controversy' rule to a particular patent matter is not easy and may involve a
determination of whether in a gray area the gray is dark enough”).

5

the courts have developed more particularized standards for determining whether a
declaratory judgment claim is supported by an actual controversy.
A.

Invoking the Patent Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction of the District Courts

When a party seeks to challenge a patent by way of a declaratory judgment claim,
it must satisfy the district court that the Federal Circuit’s two-part jurisdictional test has
been met. The Federal Circuit describes the task as follows:
First, the [patentee’s] conduct must have created on the part
of [the] plaintiff a reasonable apprehension that the
[patentee] will initiate suit if the plaintiff continues the
allegedly infringing activity. Second, the plaintiff must
have actually have either produced the device or have
prepared to produce the device.15
Thus, the “reasonable apprehension” prong of the test focuses on the patentee’s
conduct;16 the “infringer activity” prong looks to the conduct of the challenger.17
15

Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

16

Id. It is important to recognize that an individual patent challenger’s subjective
apprehension is not relevant to the actual controversy inquiry. See Phillips Plastics Corp.
v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The
‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test requires more than the nervous state of mind of a
possible infringer; it requires that the objective circumstances support such an
apprehension.”).
17

Reflecting the difficulties associated with articulating a workable and universally
applicable standard for evaluating the “infringer activity” prong of the actual controversy
test, the Federal Circuit has described this requirement variously as whether the
declaratory plaintiff has engaged in "present activity which could constitute infringement
or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity," (see BP Chem., 4 F.3d at
978 (citing Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398-99 (Fed. Cir.
1984))); "whether the declaratory plaintiff has acted in a way that the patentee asserts
infringes the patent, or is preparing to act in such a way," (see Genentech, 998 F.2d at
936 (citing Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735-36)), whether the "[p]laintiff [has] engaged in an
actual making, selling, or using activity subject to an infringement charge or [has] made
meaningful preparation for such activity," (see Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 (citing
Indium Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985))); whether the
"plaintiff's conduct evidences a real interest in an activity that may, potentially, be
enjoined," (Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 738 n.10); or whether the "plaintiff . . . actually
produced the accused device or . . . actually prepared to produce such a device" (see
Jervis B. Webb, 742 F.2d at 1399 (citing Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works,
Inc. 439 F.2d 871, 875 (1st Cir. 1971))).

6

Even if a court determines that an actual controversy exists, the court is not
required to decide the merits of the request for declaratory relief.18 Whether to exercise
jurisdiction lies in the court’s discretion. At the same, time, however, the Federal Circuit
has acknowledged that the discretion afforded by the Act is not unfettered.19 In the words
of the court, “[t]he exercise of discretion in a declaratory judgment must have a basis in
sound reason.”20

Other formulations of the test have included whether the declaratory plaintiff has
"actually produced the accused article or . . . engaged in preparations for production such
that but for a finding that the product infringes or for extraordinary and unforeseen
contingencies, the plaintiff would and could begin production immediately," (Int'l
Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing Sweetheart
Plastics, 439 F.2d at 875)), and whether the plaintiff is "engaged in manufacturing, using
or selling the invention, or . . . has the immediate intention and ability to do so,"
(Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1963) (citations
omitted) (noting that "early cases required that plaintiff actually be engaged in infringing
conduct, [but] this is no longer the law")).
18

See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952).

19

See Genentech, 998 F.2d at 936 (noting that “‘the court cannot refuse to entertain a
declaratory judgment action on a whim’” (quoting 10A Wright et al., supra note 10, §
2759, at 655-56), and that “discretion to render declaratory judgments should be
exercised to effectuate the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act” (citing 6A JAMES
W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 57.08[2], at 57-36 (2d ed. 1993))).
20

Genentech, 998 F.2d at 936 (citing Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 113
F.2d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1940)).
Although the Supreme Court held that district courts enjoy a “unique breadth” of
discretion to decline jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court expressly
declined to “delineate the outer boundaries of that discretion in other cases, for example,
cases raising issues of federal law or cases in which there are no parallel state
proceedings.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 290 (1995). This comment is
instructive with respect to declaratory judgment claims in patent cases. Most such claims
are based on federal law, and coincident parallel state court proceedings will be relatively
rare, given the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction in patent cases. See 28 U.S.C. §
1338(a) (1994). Thus, it is not clear that the Supreme Court would uphold a broad
exercise of discretion to decline to hear an accused infringer's action for a declaration of
patent invalidity or non-infringement where a patentee has asserted infringement and the
accused infringer has access to no other forum.

7

B.

The Federal Circuit’s “Reasonable Apprehension” Test

When an alleged patent infringer presents its request for declaratory relief as a
counterclaim to a claim for patent infringement, the courts, for obvious reasons, usually
do not find it necessary to elaborate on whether the defendant had a reasonable
apprehension of suit. However, when the litigation is initiated by the patent challenger,
the jurisdictional inquiry most often turns on whether the plaintiff has alleged,21 and, in
fact had,22 the requisite reasonable concern.
What is required to satisfy this prong of the actual controversy test in patent cases
has evolved.23 Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, the courts generally found an
actual controversy to exist whenever the patentee had accused the declaratory judgment
plaintiff of infringement.24 In some cases, jurisdiction was found to lie in the absence of
such a charge, and even when the patentee did not know of the plaintiff’s activities
relevant to the patent.25
In contrast, the Federal Circuit has held, for example, that a notice letter stating
that specified products “may infringe” specified patents, offering a nonexclusive license,
and requesting “some insight into [the letter recipient’s] reasons” supporting any view
that no license is needed, does not create an actual controversy.26 Even unequivocal
assertions that products “fall[] within,” “operations [are] under,” or that products are
21

The party invoking the jurisdiction of the district court must plead the “grounds upon
which the court's jurisdiction depends.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
22

The challenger-plaintiff is put to its proof if the patentee-defendant challenges the
existence of an actual controversy. See Jervis B. Webb, 742 F.2d at 1399 (stating that
“where the declaratory defendant (patentee) has denied the factual allegations that
allegedly support the existence of case or controversy, the declaratory plaintiff must
prove the existence of facts underlying such allegations”); see also K-Lath v. Davis Wire
Corp., 15 F. Supp.2d 952, 958 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that “[w]hen considering a Rule
12(b)(1) motion challenging the substance of jurisdictional allegations, the Court is not
restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as declarations
and testimony, to resolve any factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction”)
(citing McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988)).
23

See Lisa A. Dolak, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases: Restoring the
Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REV. 903, 917-932
(1997).
24

See id. at 917-922.

25

See id.

26

SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Lab., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1469-70 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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“covered by” specified patents are insufficient to create jurisdiction, in the court’s view,
at least if they are made during negotiations between the parties.27
This evolution is transparently reflected in the court’s articulated standard.
Before and since the creation of the Federal Circuit, the circuit courts of appeal generally
looked for a “reasonable apprehension of liability” on the part of the declaratory
judgment plaintiff.28 In contrast, the Federal Circuit has required the plaintiff to
demonstrate a “reasonable apprehension that it will face an infringement suit.”29 Thus,
27

See, e.g., Phillips Plastics Corp., 57 F.3d at 1053-54; Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp.,
970 F.2d 885, 888-89 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
28

See, e.g., Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium, 655 F.2d at 944 (emphasis added)
(“[a]n action for a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid, or that the plaintiff is not
infringing, is a case or controversy if the plaintiff has a real and reasonable apprehension
that he will be subject to liability if he continues to manufacture his product”); TRW, Inc.
v. Ellipse Corp., 495 F.2d 314, 320 (7th Cir. 1974) (noting that “a reasonable
apprehension of liability” is “the 'touchstone' for determining jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.”); Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
416 F.2d 707, 709 (7th Cir. 1969) (stating “the test for availability of declaratory
judgment [is] whether there is 'reasonable apprehension of liability.’”). Compare Grafon
Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d 781, 784-85 (7th Cir. 1979) (reciting a “reasonable . . .
apprehension [of] an infringement suit or the threat of one” and holding that the district
court had jurisdiction where the patentees had contacted the plaintiff’s customers and
potential customers and “notif[ied] them that [the plaintiff] no longer had any rights
under the . . . patents” or that the patentees “were seeking an injunction to prohibit [the
plaintiff] from producing [the machines at issue]”).
For a more recent application of the “reasonable apprehension of liability” standard
outside the Federal Circuit, see Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 84 F.3d 592, 595 (2d Cir.
1996) (“In a declaratory judgment action involving trademarks, the test for an “actual
case or controversy” has two prongs, both of which must be satisfied in order to establish
declaratory judgment jurisdiction: (1) has the defendant's conduct created a real and
reasonable apprehension of liability on the part of the plaintiff, and (2) has the plaintiff
engaged in a course of conduct which has brought it into adversarial conflict with the
defendant.”).
29

Indium Corp. of Am., 781 F.2d at 883 (emphasis added) (citing Jervis B. Webb, 742
F.2d at 1398-99; see also Cygnus Therapeutic Sys. v. Alza Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1159
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“an actual controversy exists if there is . . . an explicit threat or other
action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the
declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit . . ..”).
As the Solicitor General has observed in his recent amicus brief supporting the petitioner
in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Federal Circuit in one recent case raised the
articulated jurisdictional bar even further. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
9

the Federal Circuit focuses on the plaintiff’s reasonable fear of litigation, rather than a
fear of ultimate liability.30 Moreover, the court in recent cases has required the plaintiff
to prove that its reasonable apprehension was created by the patentee’s “explicit threat”
of litigation, as contrasted with an “express charge” of infringement – the standard
previously applied by the court.31 The evolution is more significant when one considers
that a merely a “charge of infringement,” or even less, was required in pre-Federal Circuit
cases.32
Thus, the Federal Circuit’s ruling in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.33 was no
surprise. In 1997, MedImmune and Genentech agreed that MedImmune would license
several patents from Genentech, including the “Cabilly I” patent.34 The license
agreement also included several pending Genentech patent applications, the claims of
which were not yet finalized.35 After one of those patent applications matured into the
“Cabilly II” patent, Genentech notified MedImmune that MedImmune’s Synagis®
product was covered by the Cabilly II patent and that MedImmune was therefore required
to pay royalties on that product under the license.36 MedImmune disagreed, and while
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 2, at 15 n. 8 (citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer,
Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“In order for this case to be one fit for
judicial review, [the putative infringer] must be able to demonstrate that it has a
reasonable apprehension of imminent suit.”) (emphasis in original)).
30

The difference is significant, including because the court's more restrictive
interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is inconsistent with the Act's purposes,
and can leave the accused patent infringer in the position of accruing liability for
damages, but without a forum for airing allegations of invalidity and/or noninfringement. See Dolak, supra note 23, at 932-48.
The Federal Circuit has never explained why it believes that a reasonable apprehension of
suit, as opposed to liability, is required by the Act or the Constitution.
31

See id. at 923-32. The Federal Circuit continues to articulate the “express charge”
standard, and has disavowed the notion that it requires that the “patentee be known to be
poised on the courthouse steps.” See id. at 928-931. However, its decisions demonstrate
that an express infringement charge may not be sufficient. See supra notes 26-27 and
accompanying text.
32

See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.

33

427 F.3d 958.

34

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, MedImmune, 427 F.3d 958 (No. 05-608).

35

Id.

36

MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 962.
10

continuing to pay the license royalties, filed an action requesting a declaratory judgment
that the Cabilly II patent was invalid or unenforceable.37
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of Genentech’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating “[t]he district court did not err in
holding that MedImmune, since under no threat or apprehension of suit, did not have
standing to bring a declaratory challenge to the Cabilly II patent.”38 The Court relied on
its prior decisions in Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.39 and MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor,
Inc. (Centocor),40 each of which involved declaratory judgment actions brought by nonbreaching licensees.
The Federal Circuit invoked its “reasonable apprehension/infringer activity” test
in Gen-Probe and held that “th[e] license, unless materially breached, obliterated any
reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit . . ..”41 Similarly, in Centocor, the court held that
“[a]ny controversy that may have existed between MedImmune and Centocor prior to and
during their various negotiations vanished when MedImmune executed the license
agreement, which is a covenant by Centocor not to sue.”42
The Federal Circuit’s disposition in the other patent declaratory judgment case
currently pending before the United States Supreme Court – Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc.43
– was equally predictable. Apotex involves a generic drug manufacturer’s effort to
invalidate an “Orange Book”-listed patent.44 Pfizer, the NDA holder, did not sue Apotex,
37

Id.

38

Id. at 965.

39

359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain a declaratory judgment action brought by a licensee in good standing against its
licensor).
40

409 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005). After accepting a license from Centocor, MedImmune
asserted that the licensed product did not infringed the licensed patent and that the patent
was invalid and/or unenforceable, and filed a declaratory judgment action (without
ceasing royalty payments) when Centocor held MedImmune to its license obligations. Id.
at 1378.
41

Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1381.

42

Centocor, 409 F.3d at 1379.

43

159 Fed.App’x 1013. The Supreme Court has requested the views of the Solicitor
General. Apotex, 126 S.Ct. 2057.
44

Pursuant to portions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, Pub.L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc and 35
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the ANDA applicant, before or after the expiration of the 45 day period after receiving
the Apotex notice of its ANDA filing/Paragraph IV certification.45 Pfizer had sued
IVAX, the first ANDA applicant for the drug at issue, and had settled that lawsuit by
agreeing that IVAX would be licensed under the Pfizer patent at issue, effective as of the
expiration of an earlier Pfizer patent covering the same drug product.46 Under the
applicable statutory scheme, IVAX, as the first ANDA applicant, is entitled to a 180-day
period of marketing exclusivity.47 Specifically, in this circumstance, the FDA is barred
from approving the Apotex ANDA until the earlier of the end of IVAX’s 180 market
exclusivity period or a judicial declaration that the patent at issue is invalid or not
infringed.48 Thus, it is in Pfizer’s interest to avoid judicial scrutiny of the patent at issue
pending the completion of IVAX’s exclusivity period.

U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2003)), a brand-name drug manufacturer who has obtained
Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) marketing approval for its drug product through
the FDA “New Drug Application” (“NDA”) approval process must notify the FDA of all
patents that “claim[] the drug for which the [NDA] applicant submitted the application . .
. and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted . .
. .” 21 U.S.C. §355(b)(1), (c)(2). The FDA publication that identifies such patents is
known as the “Orange Book.” A generic drug manufacturer who wishes to utilize the
FDA’s “Abbreviated New Drug Application” process (and thereby obtain marketing
approval for the generic drug product by virtue of its bioequivalence with the NDAapproved drug) must certify that “(I) that such [Orange Book] patent information has not
been filed, (II) that such patent has expired, (III) . . . the date on which such patent will
expire, or (IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use,
or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted . . . .” 21 U.S.C.
§355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I-IV).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A), the filing of an ANDA “for a drug claimed in a patent”
constitutes an act of patent infringement if the ANDA applicant seeks approval to market
the generic drug before the expiration of the patent(s) at issue (i.e., files a “Paragragh IV”
certification). If the patent owner does not file suit against the ANDA applicant within
45 days after receiving the required notice of the ANDA filing, the FDA is authorized to
approve the ANDA. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). However, if/when the ANDA
application commences marketing the generic drug product, the patent owner is free to
sue the ANDA for infringement.
45

Apotex, 385 F.Supp.2d at 190.

46

Id.

47

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).

48

See id.
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Apotex filed an action against Pfizer seeking a declaration that the patent at issue
was not infringed.49 The district court granted Pfizer’s motion to dismiss, holding that
none of (1) Pfizer’s Orange Book listing, (2) Pfizer’s suit against IVAX, (3) Pfizer’s
history of litigation against other generic drug companies (regarding other Pfizer patents
and generic versions of Pfizer products), or (4) Pfizer’s refusal to agree that Apotex does
not infringe created the requisite reasonable apprehension of suit.50 Along the way, the
district court rejected Pfizer’s argument that the then-recently enacted “Medicare
Amendments” to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)51 altered or obviated the
“reasonable apprehension of suit” requirement for patent declaratory judgment actions,
stating “[t]he Medicare Amendments do not disturb the Federal Circuit’s consistent
holding that the constitutional limits of an Article III court’s jurisdiction in anticipatory
patent infringement declaratory judgment actions are defined by the two-part reasonable
apprehension test.”52 The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed,53 presumably satisfied
that the Apotex facts were indistinguishable from those in Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v.
Pfizer Inc.,54 which it had decided (in favor of the declaratory judgment defendant) just
about a year earlier.
The court made it clear in MedImmune and Teva that the “reasonable
apprehension of suit” requirement is jurisdictional.55 But policy considerations also
49

Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 188.

50

Id. at 194.

51

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub.L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) amended both the FDCA and the Patent Act
to provide that if the patent owner or NDA holder does not sue the ANDA applicant
within 45 days of receiving notice of the ANDA submission, the ANDA applicant may
seek a declaratory judgment of non-infringement or invalidity. See 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(C) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5). The latter provides that in such circumstances,
“the courts of the United States shall, to the extent consistent with the Constitution, have
subject matter jurisdiction in any action brought by such person under section 2201 of
title 28 for a declaratory judgment that such patent is invalid or not infringed.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(5).
52

53

Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93.
Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 159 Fed. App’x 1013.

54

395 F.3d 1324, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e agree with the district court that Teva
failed to establish that an actual controversy existed between it and Pfizer, as required
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).”).
55

See MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 964-65 (“Thus although courts have discretion in
deciding whether to accept a declaratory judgment action when the constitutional and
statutory requirements are met, there is no discretion to accept an action when there is no
13

played a role in these cases. The court held MedImmune controlled by Gen-Probe, where
the court cited the “undesirable results” that would obtain were a non-breaching licensee
permitted to sue, namely:
Allowing this action to proceed would effectively defeat
[the] contractual covenants [of the license] and discourage
patentees from granting licenses. In other words, in this
situation, the licensor would bear all the risk, while licensee
would benefit from the license’s effective cap on damages
or royalties in the event its challenge to the patent’s scope
or validity fails.56
And in his dissent from the court’s denial of Teva’s petition for panel rehearing and
rehearing en banc, Judge Gajarsa noted that “[t]he Teva court ignores [relevant]
precedent and reads general infringement policy considerations into Article III, where
they do not belong.”57 As discussed below, the Federal Circuit’s declaratory judgment
jurisdiction is inconsistent and ambiguous with respect to the distinction between
jurisdiction – the power of the lower federal courts to hear declaratory judgment cases –
and the appropriate role of policy considerations in declaratory judgment justiciability
determinations.
II.

JUDICIAL POWER VS. JUDICIAL DISCRETION

The Federal Circuit has confused and conflated jurisdictional and prudential facts
and considerations throughout its quarter-century-long tenure. The confusion is exhibited

controversy of immediacy or reality because there is no reasonable apprehension of
suit.”); Teva, 395 F.3d at 1333 (“In order for this case to be one fit for judicial review,
Teva must be able to demonstrate that it has a reasonable apprehension of imminent suit. .
. . This requirement of imminence reflects the Article III mandate that the injury in fact
be ‘concrete,’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Centocor, 409 F.3d at 1382 (“[T]he ‘Hobson’s
choice’ [of whether to litigate or take a license] about which MedImmune complains
arises not from Gen-Probe, but from Article III’s requirement that, before a district court
exercises jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment suit, there must be an actual controversy
between the parties.”); Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1382 (“Under these circumstances, there
is not a reasonable apprehension of suit. Therefore, this court holds that no actual
controversy supports jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act . . . .”).
56

Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1382.

57

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 405 F.3d 990, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Gajarsa, J.
dissenting).
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both in the court’s articulations of the governing standards and in its application of those
standards in the appeals it hears.
A.

The Justiciability Standard: Constitutional Mandate or Federal Circuit Policy?

Throughout its tenure, the court has recognized that the Act’s “actual
controversy” requirement is constitutionally mandated,58 and that the Act neither confers
jurisdiction on the federal courts59 nor imposes jurisdictional requirements above and
beyond those compelled by the Constitution.60 And, in the cases discussed herein and in
many others,61 the court has used its reasonable apprehension test to determine whether
58

See, e.g., MedImmune, 409 F.3d at 1382 (“[T]he ‘Hobson’s choice’ [of whether to
litigate or take a license] about which MedImmune complains arises . . . from Article III’s
requirement that, before a district court exercises jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment
suit, there must be an actual controversy between the parties.”); Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v.
Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“A declaratory judgment action permits a
threatened party to resolve its potential liability, but only when the situation has
progressed to an actual controversy, as required by Article III of the Constitution.”);
Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735 (“The competing considerations are of constitutional
dimension: (1) there must be an actual controversy over which a federal court may
exercise jurisdiction . . . ; (2) to proceed in the absence of a case or controversy would
involve the court in rendering a forbidden advisory opinion.”) (citing Aetna, 300 U.S. at
239-40 (“The Declaratory Judgment Act . . . is operative only in respect to controversies
which are such in the constitutional sense.”)); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“It goes without saying that
federal courts do not sit to render advisory opinions. Thus, the Declaratory Judgment Act
requires the existence of an actual case or controversy between the parties before a
federal court can constitutionally assume jurisdiction.”).
59

See, e.g., Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 469, 479 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Without
that controversy, no suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act could be maintained
because, as the Supreme Court has said, the Declaratory Judgment Act gives no
independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction in district court.”) (citing Skelly Oil Co.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950)).
60

Jervis B. Webb, 742 F.2d at 1398 (“[T]he case or controversy requirement for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction has been defined to be the same as the case or
controversy requirement in the constitutional sense.”).

61

See, e.g., Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prod., Inc., 387 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“Declaratory justiciability of patent disputes requires both (1) a threat or other action by
the patentee whereby the declaratory plaintiff has a reasonable apprehension that he will
be sued for infringement, and (2) activity by the declaratory plaintiff that constitutes the
alleged infringement or active preparation to conduct such activity.”); Hunter Douglas,
Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“When a
declaratory judgment plaintiff alleges that the claims of a patent are not infringed,
15

an “actual controversy” exists, thus effectively equating its test with the constitutional
minimum requirements.
Recently, however, several of the court’s members have explicitly disclaimed the
jurisdictional essence of the reasonable apprehension test. For example, in his opinion
dissenting from the court’s denial of the petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en
banc in Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., Judge Gajarsa (joined by Judge Dyk)
wrote: “Article III does not compel [the reasonable apprehension test], and the Supreme
Court has rejected the doctrinal rigidity [the panel opinion in Teva] introduces.”62 Judge
Dyk (joined by Judge Gajarsa) went even further, observing that what little Supreme
Court precedent exists regarding Article III and declaratory judgments “provide no
support for a reasonable apprehension of imminent suit requirement,” noting the Ninth
Circuit’s use of the “‘reasonable apprehension [of] liability’” standard, and pointing out
that the First Circuit has held the “reasonable apprehension” (of suit or of liability)
construct “irrelevant” under particular circumstances.63
To be sure, the court has said that the reasonable apprehension test is not the only
vehicle that can be used to evaluate whether an actual controversy exists.64 And on
invalid, or unenforceable, we apply a two-step test to determine whether there is an actual
controversy.”), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Industries, Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed.Cir. 1999); Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 835 F.2d
859, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“In declaratory judgment patent suits, there are two
prerequisites for establishing the existence of a case or actual controversy between the
parties: first, the defendant must have engaged in conduct giving rise to a reasonable
apprehension on plaintiff's part that it will face an infringement suit or the threat of one if
it commences or continues the activity in question; second, the plaintiff must have
actually produced the accused device or have actually prepared to produce it.”)
62

Teva, 405 F.3d at 991 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).

63

Id. at 996-97 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citing Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium,
655 F.2d at 944 (emphasis in original)) and Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA,
273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001)).
The declaratory judgment plaintiff in Sallen had lost his domain name in an arbitration
proceeding and sued for a declaration that he was entitled to it under United States law.
Sallen, 273 F.3d at 21-22. The First Circuit held there existed a “certain controversy”
sufficient for jurisdiction. Id. at 25.
64

See Fina Oil Chem. Co., 123 F.3d at 1470 (“Satisfaction of th[e] traditional two-part
test is not . . . a prerequisite to jurisdiction in every possible patent declaratory judgment
action. Indeed, the two elements merely assure that the declaratory plaintiff has enough
interest in the subject matter of the suit and that the disagreement between the parties is
real and immediate enough to fulfill the ‘actual controversy’ requirement.”).
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several occasions, it has justified the test’s application with reference to its asserted
practical utility.65 But the fact is that the reasonable apprehension test is the pivot on
which the jurisdiction/no jurisdiction inquiry turns in most cases. Therefore, regardless
of the court’s characterizations of the test as “pragmatic” and “useful,”66 the reality –
especially for the declaratory judgment plaintiffs the court has turned away for lack of a
“reasonable apprehension of suit” – is that the reasonable apprehension standard has
effectively been elevated to constitutional status. Otherwise, either the court has
erroneously interpreted the Act as including a jurisdictional requirement or requirements
above and beyond what the Constitution requires,67 or it has imposed its own heightened
65

See, e.g., Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1379 (“Through its cases, this court has developed a
pragmatic inquiry that focuses on not only the conduct of the patentee but also the
conduct of the putative infringer: ‘There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other
action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the
declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present
activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to
conduct such activity.’”) (quoting BP Chem., 4 F.3d at 978; Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736
(prefacing its application of the two-step test by describing it as a “[A] test often useful in
evaluating complaints for declaratory judgments in patent cases”).
66

See id.

67

In the words of the Court:
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to
‘cases of actual controversy,' manifestly has regard to the
constitutional provision and is operative only in respect to
controversies which are such in the constitutional sense.
The word 'actual' is one of emphasis rather than of
definition. Thus the operation of the Declaratory Judgment
Act is procedural only. In providing remedies and defining
procedure in relation to cases and controversies in the
constitutional sense the Congress is acting within its
delegated power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts
which the Congress is authorized to establish.

Aetna, 300 U.S. at 239-40. The Court later elaborated:
Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the
federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction. When
concerned as we are with the power of the inferior federal
courts to entertain litigation within the restricted area to
which the Constitution and Acts of Congress confine them,
'jurisdiction' means the kinds of issues which give right of
entrance to federal courts. Jurisdiction in this sense was not
altered by the Declaratory Judgment Act.
17

prudential standard. The former notion – that the statute itself imposes jurisdictional
conditions – cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act, which
interpretation the Federal Circuit has acknowledged.68 As discussed below, the latter
disregards Congressional intent, as reflected in the plain language of the statute.69
There is ample evidence that the court’s “reasonable apprehension” standard is
motivated by policy concerns. For example, the court has said that it “maintain[s] this
requirement, for it ‘protects quiescent patent owners against unwarranted litigation’
. . ..”70 According to Judge Gajarsa, “[the Federal Circuit’s] cases recognize reasonable
apprehension, in the typical patent infringement case, as but a pragmatic attempt to give
operational guidance against which patentees can structure their conduct, and control
their litigation costs, in a fact-specific area of law.”71 And, in the licensee-in-goodstanding-as-plaintiff situation, the court explained:
[P]ermitting [the licensee] to pursue a lawsuit without
materially breaching its license agreement yields
undesirable results. [The patentee] voluntarily relinquished
its statutory right to exclude by granting [the licensee] a
nonexclusive license. In so doing, [the patentee] chose to
avoid litigation as an avenue of enforcing its rights.
Allowing this action to proceed would effectively defeat
those contractual covenants and discourage patentees from
granting licenses. In other words, in this situation, the
licensor would bear all the risk, while licensee would
benefit from the license’s effective cap on damages or
royalties in the event its challenge to the patent’s scope or
validity fails.72
As the above examples show, on some occasions the court substantiates its reasonable
apprehension test with policy justifications. On others, however, the court has

Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671.
68

See, e.g., Glaxo, Inc. v. Novapharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing
Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671-21 and Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240).
69

See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.

70

Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736).

71

Teva, 405 F.3d at 991 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (joined by Judge Dyk).

72

Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1382.
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unequivocally linked its test to both the language of the Act and to the applicable
constitutional constraints, as these excerpts illustrate:
From Sierra Applied Sciences, Inc. v. Advanced Energy Industries, Inc.73:
Here, AEI’s conduct created the requisite reasonable
apprehension of suit as to Sierra’s past sales of the 2 kW
power supply, and such sales in fact took place within the
relevant time period, establishing the district court’s Article
III jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the past sales of the 2
kW power supply constituted infringement of the ‘813
patent, and to adjudicate whether the ‘813 patent is
invalid.74
From MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc75:
Thus although courts have discretion in deciding whether to
accept a declaratory action when the constitutional and
statutory requirements are met, there is no discretion to
accept an action when there is no controversy of immediacy
or reality because there is not reasonable apprehension of
suit.76
And from Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc.77:
In order for this case to be one fit for judicial review, Teva
must be able to demonstrate that it has a reasonable
apprehension of imminent suit. Whether there is an “actual
controversy” between parties having adverse legal interests
depends upon whether the facts alleged show that there is a
substantial controversy between the parties “of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.”. . . This requirement of imminence
reflects the Article III mandate that the injury in fact be

73

363 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

74

Id. at 1377 (emphasis added).

75

427 F.3d 958.

76

Id. at 964-65 (emphasis added).

77

395 F.3d 1324.
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“concrete,” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.”78
“We do not think that the cases cited by Teva support the
proposition that the reasonable apprehension of suit prong
of our traditional two-part test is not a constitutional
requirement.”79
“We conclude that the plain language of the statute, as well
as the legislative history, support the conclusion that
Congress did not intend for the Medicare Amendments to
cause courts to alter the requirement of the two-part test
that a declaratory judgment plaintiff must demonstrate a
“reasonable apprehension” of suit to establish Article III
jurisdiction.”80
In fact the court has specifically rejected a litigant’s argument that the two-step test
“represents a prudential rule rather than a constitutional requirement.”81 Clearly, as a
matter of jurisprudential integrity, the court cannot have it both ways.
Without a doubt, the Declaratory Judgment Act accommodates the exercise of
judicial discretion. The Act says “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction
. . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party . . ..”82 And the Supreme Court has flatly declared “[t]his is an
enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon
the litigant.”83 But the Act clearly distinguishes between jurisdiction and discretion,
conferring upon a court the discretion to exercise – or not – the authority it possesses to
decide “a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction.” It thus obliges its own twostep analysis. First, the court should determine whether the case presents an Article III
controversy. Then, if (and only if) the court concludes that it has jurisdiction to decide
the dispute, it should evaluate the relevant prudential considerations and decide whether
the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate.

78

Id. at 1333 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

79

Id. at 1335 (emphasis added).

80

Id. at 1337 (emphasis added).

81

Id. at 1335.

82

28 U.S.C. §2201 (1985) (emphasis added).

83

Public Serv. Comm’n, 344 U.S. at 241.
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The Federal Circuit has, in fact, recognized the appropriate analytical framework.
It has said “[t]here is no absolute right to a declaratory judgment. The Act says a court
‘may’ grant one. Hence, when there is a clear controversy and thus jurisdiction, a district
court’s decision on whether to exercise that jurisdiction is discretionary.”84 The court
also understands that jurisdiction is the prerequisite to the exercise of discretion,85 and
that a two-step inquiry is appropriately applied.86 Thus the problem is not that the
Federal Circuit has taken policy into account in evaluating declaratory judgment
justiciability. The problem is the extent to which it has permitted policy to influence the
first step – the constitutional or jurisdictional analysis – as evidenced by its justifications
for87 and application of its two-step reasonable apprehension/infringer activity test.88
B. The Standard in Action: Which Facts are Which?
Despite its policy justifications for its actual controversy test, the Federal Circuit
has made clear that test is jurisdictional.89 Thus, the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s
ability to satisfy the reasonable apprehension prong (along with the infringer activity
prong) is a separate inquiry from whether a court should hear or decline to hear a given
declaratory claim in exercising its discretion under the Act.90 In subject matter
84

Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735 n.6.

85

See, e.g., Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 634 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“When there is no actual controversy, the court has no discretion to decide the case.
When there is an actual controversy and thus jurisdiction, the exercise of that jurisdiction
is discretionary.”), quoted in Teva, 395 F.3d at 1332 n.6, Fina Oil & Chem. Co.,123 F.3d
at 1471 n.4, and EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
86

See, e.g., Capo, 387 F.3d at 1356 (agreeing with the district court that the facts
presented an actual controversy, but vacating the court’s decision on the given facts to
decline to exercise jurisdiction as an abuse of discretion); EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 815
(holding that although EMC had established the existence of an actual controversy, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction).
87

See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.

88

See infra notes 93-117 and accompanying text.

89

See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.

90

See EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 815 (holding that the patentee's conduct was sufficient to
create an actual controversy conferring jurisdiction on the district court, and upholding
the district court's discretionary refusal to exercise that jurisdiction); Spectronics Corp. v.
H.B. Fuller, 940 F.2d 631, 633 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (distinguishing dismissals based on the
lack of an actual controversy, “and therefore jurisdiction,” and those based on
discretionary authority). The court in Spectronics explained the relationship between the
“absolute predicate” of an actual controversy, and the discretionary authority to exercise
21

jurisdiction determinations regarding declaratory judgment claims, the Federal Circuit
and the district courts sometimes give separate attention to the discretionary aspects of
the Act, whether91 or not92 they conclude that the jurisdictional prerequisite is met.93
the jurisdiction that controversy confers as follows: “When there is no actual
controversy, the court has no discretion to decide the case. When there is an actual
controversy and thus jurisdiction, the exercise of that jurisdiction is discretionary.” Id.
(citing Public Serv. Comm'n, 344 U.S. at 241 and Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735 n.6).
91

See generally EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 813-15 (evaluating the propriety of the district
court's decision not to exercise discretion over alleged infringer's declaratory judgment
claim against the patentee, even though the “actual controversy” requirement was met);
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL
71492, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1996) (denying patentee's request that the court exercise
discretion and refuse to hear alleged infringer's declaratory judgment action, where an
actual controversy existed at the time the alleged infringer filed its complaint and no
grounds for an exception to the first-filed rule were shown); KPR, Inc. v. C & F Packing
Co., Inc., No. 4:93-CV-243-Y, 1993 WL 726236, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 1993)
(dismissing alleged infringer's declaratory judgment claims in favor of patentee's laterfiled patent infringement claims).
92

See generally Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Ciba Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 271, 274-75
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over contact lens manufacturer's
declaratory judgment claim against patentee “[e]ven if . . . [manufacturer] had met the
actual-controversy requirement”); Waters Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 999 F. Supp.
167, 174 (D. Mass. 1998) (basing grant of patentee's motion to dismiss on both a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and the court's discretion to decline jurisdiction); Envtl.
Dynamics, Inc. v. Robert Tyer and Assoc., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1212, 1249-50 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (holding that propriety of deferring to sister court's jurisdiction over permanent
injunction and right to revisit its own judgments constitutes separate basis – apart from
lack of actual controversy – for dismissing declaratory judgment counterclaims).
93

In some cases, an actual controversy existing between the parties at the time suit is
filed is mooted by subsequent events. For example, the court may dismiss the patentee's
infringement claim prior to consideration of the opponent's claim for a declaration of
invalidity. See, e.g., Industrias Metalicas Marva, Inc. v. Lausell, No. 96-1697, 1997 WL
557626, at *17 (D.P.R. Aug. 28, 1997) (granting summary judgment to alleged infringer
on the patentee's infringement claim). Alternatively, the patentee may stipulate that the
opponent's activities do not infringe the patent(s) at issue. See, e.g., Spectronics, 940
F.2d at 633 (discussing patentee's covenant not to sue, designated as a “Statement of Non
Liability”); Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc., No. 94-572-SLR, 1996 WL
571541, at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 20, 1996) (concluding that the patentee's “Statement of
Nonliability is sufficient to protect [declaratory judgment] plaintiff against any
reasonable apprehension of suit for any products it currently manufactures or has taken
concrete steps to manufacture in the future” and, consequently, dismissing claim for
declaration of non-infringement and invalidity). Alternatively, the patentee may promise
22

However, as discussed below, the courts frequently base actual controversy
determinations in part or in whole on considerations which should factor, if at all, only in
their discretionary ruminations. This failure to distinguish between jurisdictional, or
constitutional, considerations on the one hand, and discretionary, or policy,
considerations on the other, occurs with respect to both prongs of the actual controversy
test. Its potentially negative implications justify greater attention to the distinction.
1.

The “Reasonable Apprehension” Prong

In defense of its restrictive stance on the availability of declaratory judgment
relief against patentees,94 the Federal Circuit has admonished that “more is required than
the existence of an adversely held patent,”95 and “that a patent exists does not alone
not to sue the opponent for infringement based on current or past activities. See, e.g.,
Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1056-57, 1059-60 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (deciding patentee's motion to dismiss grounded on its promise, manifested in
its attorney's statement in motion papers and briefs, not to sue its opponent for
infringement of the patents at issue based on the challenger's past or current products);
Newman-Green, Inc. v. AptarGroup, Inc., No. 97 C 3489, 1998 WL 178584, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 5, 1998) (granting patentee's motion to dismiss based upon its “unconditional
promise not to sue” the declaratory judgment plaintiff for infringement in its pleading);
Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., No. 93 C 3200, 1994 WL 8234, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7,
1994) (evaluating the effect of the patentee's “stipulation . . . that it will never sue [the
patent challenger] or its customers for infringement of the patent at issue in the litigation”
on its jurisdiction over the challenger's declaratory judgment counterclaim).
In such situations, the courts have consistently held that such subsequent events divest the
court of jurisdiction. See generally Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1059-60 (affirming district
court dismissal of declaratory judgment counterclaim, noting that the “promise not to sue
is the heart of the matter”, as the resulting “estoppel . . . removes . . . any controversy
sufficiently actual to confer jurisdiction”); Spectronics, 940 F.2d at 637 (holding that
“[t]o proceed would 'involve the court in rendering a forbidden advisory opinion'“)
(quoting Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735); Industrias Metalicas, 1997 WL 557626, at * 18
(concluding that it lacks jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment counterclaim once the
infringement claim is dismissed, in the absence of any jurisdictional grounds independent
of the infringement action); Zip Dee, 1994 WL 8234, at * 1 (holding that Article III and
the Declaratory Judgment Act require it to decline what amounts, under the
circumstances, to a request for an advisory opinion). This result is attributed to the
constitutional and statutory requirement that the declaratory judgment claimant
demonstrate that “‘jurisdiction over its declaratory judgment action existed at, and has
continued since, the time the [claim] was filed.’” Spectronics, 940 F.2d at 635 (quoting
Int'l Med. Prosthetics Research Assoc., 787 F.2d at 575.).
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See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.

95

BP Chem., 4 F.3d at 978.
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create a right to challenge its validity in court.”96 The court’s explication of the policy
underlying the rule that the mere existence of an “adversely held patent”97 is insufficient
for jurisdiction is no more elucidating. According to the court, this rule “protects
quiescent patent owners against unwarranted litigation.”98 But no credible commentator
or litigant has contended that patents are vulnerable to declaratory judgment attack
merely because they exist.
Such strawmen contribute little to the analysis. Clearly, persons with a mere
academic interest in a particular patent’s validity do not have standing to challenge it.99

96

Int'l Med. Prosthetics Research Assoc., 787 F.2d at 575.

97

See BP Chem., 4 F.3d at 978.

98

Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.

99

See Precision Shooting Equip., 646 F.2d at 316 (noting that “[a] court will not render
advisory opinions or expound on academic or moot questions merely to satisfy the
curiosity of the parties”).
Likewise, it is well established that a party cannot satisfy the “infringer activity”
requirement by asserting that “but for” the existence of the patent, it would engage in
particular activity. See generally BP Chem., 4 F.3d at 980 (rejecting as insufficient the
challenger's allegations that its licensee would use a specified process in the absence of
the patentee's patent).
By way of comparison, the Supreme Court has held that citizen groups who allege, by
way of affidavits and testimony, that their enjoyment of the river in question has been
adversely affected by alleged violations of the federal Clean Water Act, have standing to
sue to enforce the statute. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000). The jurisdictional requirements of the Declaratory Judgment
Act were not at issue in Friends, but the Court's holding establishes that a specific “but
for” averments can sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements. See id. at 18384. Inasmuch as the standing requirements of the Constitution and the Declaratory
Judgment Act are the same (see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text), the Supreme
Court's decision in Friends undermines the notion that dismissal of a declaratory
judgment claim based on a “but for” allegation is jurisdictionally mandated. Cf. BP
Chem., 4 F.3d at 980 (“That a superior process is patented to another, and unavailable for
use without a license, does not of itself create a justiciable controversy.”).
It should be noted, in this regard, that the plaintiff in BP Chemicals never alleged that a
justiciable controversy existed solely by virtue of the existence of the patent. The
plaintiff and patentee were “competitors in the business of licensing technology for the
manufacture of polymers of ethylene.” Id. at 977. During license negotiations with
existing and potential licensees of the challenger, the patentee had made statements
24

Furthermore, in the main, of course, the cases presenting contested issues of declaratory
judgment jurisdiction do not involve “quiescent” patentees.100 Nonetheless, jurisdiction
has been found wanting even where patentees have engaged in substantial vexatious
conduct.101 Rarely would the truly quiescent patent owner need the protection of the
“actual controversy” requirement of the Constitution and the Act. Even in the absence of
such a requirement, the expense and aggravation of patent litigation would deter purely
academic attacks on patents.
More importantly, however, the protection of patent owners has been offered as a
justification/basis for distinguishing between constitutionally cognizable “actual
controvers[ies],” and disputes of hypothetical or abstract character.102 Yet protecting
patent owners, a concededly laudable objective, ought to be regarded as a matter of
legislative or judicial policy. It clearly is not a matter of the federal courts’ constitutional
power. Put another way, the “actual controversy” issue concerns the jurisdiction of the
federal district courts, not patent policy.
In addition, many of the factors courts rely on to justify denials of jurisdiction on
the basis that the reasonable apprehension prong is not satisfied should not be regarded as
bearing on the court’s power to hear the declaratory judgment claim. For example,
concerning the strength of its patent and its intent to enforce the patent. See id. at 978980. The challenger alleged that the patent was invalid and/or unenforceable. Thus, the
parties' controversy extended beyond the challenger's wish that there were no such patent.
The BP Chemicals court's “superior process” comment is one example of the courts'
tendency to set up a jurisdictional “strawman” when discussing the justiciability of
declaratory judgment claims. See, e.g., Precision Shooting Equip., 646 F.2d at 316 (“A
court will not render advisory opinions or expound on academic or moot questions
merely to satisfy the curiosity of the parties.”). See also Howard T. Markey (former
Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit), On Simplifying Patent Trials, 116 F.R.D. 369, 377
n.15 (remarking, on the subject of declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases, that
“[c]ourts have no roving commission to destroy every invalid patent”). Such hyperbole,
of course, does little to advance the inquiry in particular cases.
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See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., SRI Int’l, 127 F.3d at 1469-70, Phillips Plastics Corp., 57 F.3d at 1053-54.

102

See Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1326-27 (“We have maintained this requirement, for
it ‘protects quiescent patent owners against unwarranted litigation’ under Title 35. The
‘reasonable apprehension’ prong of the two-part test thus contributes to policing the
boundary between a constitutional controversy, which is judicially cognizable under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, and ‘a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract or
character,’ which is not.”) (quoting Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 and Aetna, 300 U.S. at
240).
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accused infringers who initiate declaratory judgment actions while license or settlement
negotiations are pending can expect to have the courthouse door slammed in their
faces.103 The courts generally deem the patentee’s willingness to engage in negotiations,
even where it has not promised to forbear initiating its own suit, as negating any
reasonable apprehension of suit on the part of the potential infringer.104 The courts have
similarly regarded other factors as having constitutional significance in the jurisdictional
calculus, such as the fact that (1) the patentee’s “cease and desist” letter was sent by the
patentee’s in-house executive (as opposed to outside counsel),105 (2) the potential
infringer initiated the contact between the parties,106 or even (3) the patentee is not a large
business concern.107
In reality, however, these factors in no way negate the existence of a real,
immediate, legal controversy between the parties. As the Federal Circuit has itself
acknowledged, the potential infringer’s participation in license negotiations is often
principally attributable to the patentee’s spoken or unspoken threat of litigation.108 By
103

See, e.g., Phillips, 57 F.3d at 1053-54 (regarding the “ongoing license negotiations”
between the patentee and a potential infringer as a significant factor in negating the
existence of an actual controversy); Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 888 (holding that the patentee's
statement that the declaratory judgment claimant's activities “fall within” the claims of
the patent was not an express charge of infringement and did not give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of suit because it was made in the context of license negotiations).
104

See generally id.

105

See, e.g., Dataline, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom Network Serv., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 1578,
2001 WL 102336, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2001).

106

See, e.g., CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Beloit Corp., 957 F. Supp. 784, 790 (E.D.Va.
1997) (including among its reasons for holding that there was no reasonable apprehension
of suit, the fact that the contact between the declaratory judgment plaintiff and the
patentee was initiated by the plaintiff).

107

See, e.g., Ryobi Am. Corp. v. Peters, 815 F. Supp. 172, 175 (D.S.C. 1993) (noting that
the patentee is “an individual who has created a small side line business in his home
workshop).

108

EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 811. In the words of the court:
To be sure, any time parties are in negotiations over patent
rights, the possibility of a lawsuit looms in the background.
No patent owner with any sense would open negotiations
by assuring his opposite party that he does not intend to
enforce his patent rights under any circumstances. The
threat of enforcement – either directly by the patentee or
indirectly by a third party to whom the patentee licenses or
26

the same token, the potential infringer’s willingness to engage in negotiations does not
necessarily mean that it has no valid basis for challenging the patent. Both parties are
presumably at the negotiation table, at least in part, to try to avoid the substantial costs
associated with patent litigation.109 And relying on the fact that the patentee
communicated via its in-house executive, the potential infringer contacted the patentee
first, or the patentee is “small” to conclude that a federal court lacks power to adjudicate
a real, concrete, substantial dispute about a patent’s validity, enforceability, or
infringement between a putative infringer who will otherwise suffer injury and a patentee
is no less than absurd. Such factors may constitute good reason for refusing to exercise,
on a discretionary basis, the jurisdiction the court possesses. But they do not change the
fact that a true controversy exists between the parties, and ought not to be held to negate
the “actual controversy” required by the Act and the Constitution.110
sells the patent – is the entire source of the patentee's
bargaining power. . . . Thus, it is unrealistic to suggest that
some negotiating patentees intend to enforce their patents
while some do not, and that the first group is subject to
declaratory judgment jurisdiction while the second is not.
Id.
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The results of a recent survey indicate that the average cost of patent litigation where
the amount at issue is between $1 million to $25 million is $2 million. See Report of the
Economic Survey, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, at 22 (2003).

110

In one of the relatively few decisions carefully distinguishing between jurisdictional
(i.e., constitutional or statutory) and discretionary/policy considerations in the context of
patent declaratory judgment claims, the jurisprudential significance of license
negotiations was explained as follows:
In many cases . . . , it is the threat of litigation which serves
as the motivating factor for negotiation. This being the
situation, it is more analytically sound to treat the questions
of settlement and negotiation as part of the discretion issue.
In other words, an explicit threat of patent litigation gives
rise to a reasonable apprehension of suit and
simultaneously provides the initiative to enter negotiations
designed to avoid that litigation. The controversy thus
becomes ripe for adjudication as soon as the initial threat of
patent litigation is made; but so long as one party
reasonably relies on the forbearance of the other during
subsequent negotiations, there may be equitable and public
policy reasons for discretionary dismissal of a declaratory
action when one party unfairly takes advantage of that
forbearance to secure a more convenient forum.
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In many cases, allocating factors such as these, which do not negate the existence
of a real, immediate controversy, to the discretionary analysis will not change the
outcome of the case. In such cases, only the basis on which the court’s decision to hear
the declaratory judgment claim rests will change.111 Nevertheless, it is important, for
many reasons, to distinguish between constitutional and statutory bases for denying
jurisdiction and those that should be regarded as policy considerations.112
2.

The “Infringer Activity” Prong

The courts also confuse jurisdictional and policy considerations when evaluating
the sufficiency of the potential infringer’s activity. As noted above, the courts profess to
permit patent challengers to proceed with declaratory judgment claims, assuming the
requisite reasonable apprehension, even if they are not presently engaging in infringing
activity.113 “Meaningful preparation” to engage in activity that could constitute
infringement is said to be enough.114 Nevertheless, even where infringers are engaged in
significant preparatory activity, the courts have dismissed their declaratory judgment
claims on the ground, inter alia, that the potentially infringing products could change
before they are finalized and marketed. In so doing, the courts mistake the jurisdictional
significance of the potential for product evolution.
For example, in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co.,115 the Federal Circuit held that
no actual controversy existed to support a patentee’s request for declaratory relief when
the product at issue–an implantable defibrillator—had not yet received FDA approval.116
According to the court, two factors supported its conclusion: (1) the uncertainty
Agridyne Tech., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 863 F. Supp. 1522, 1527 n.6 (D. Utah 1994).
111

See id. (noting that its proposed reshuffling of the jurisdictional analysis would not
change the outcome in that case)

112

See infra notes 118-167 and accompanying text.

113

See supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying text.

114

See supra note 17 for a description of the various formulations of the test for infringer
activity.

115

991 F.2d 808, 1993 WL 87405 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 1993) (unpublished table decision).

116

See id., at *4; see also Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d
1520, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming district court decision that it lacked jurisdiction
over a patentee's claim for a declaratory judgment of infringement in part because
“[t]here was no certainty that the device [at issue] when approved [by the Food and Drug
Administration] would be the same device that began clinical trials”).
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regarding when approval might be obtained; and (2) the possibility that the FDA could
require changes to the device.117 However, even if a court in a particular case is justified
in declining to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment claim in a particular case
on the ground that a present expenditure of the court’s time and effort is not justified in
view of anticipated changes to the product, such a concern is prudential–not
jurisdictional–in character.118
III.

PRUDENCE VS. POWER: IT MATTERS IN PATENT CASES

The outcome of many justiciability determinations affecting declaratory judgment
claims in patent cases will be the same regardless of whether constitutional or prudential
rationales are invoked.119 For example, a court’s decision that pending license
negotiations negate an actual controversy places, to a certain extent,120 a declaratory
117

Teletronics, 982 F.2d at 1527.

118

The Federal Circuit in Intermedics raised the uncertainty regarding the timing of FDA
approval and the possibility that changes would occur to the device in the context of its
discussion of the jurisdictional requirement of an actual controversy under the
Declaratory Judgment Act. See Intermedics, 1993 WL 87405, at *4. And the district
court had dismissed the patentee's declaratory judgment claim on the ground that there
was no case or controversy between the parties. See Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co.,
775 F. Supp. 1269, 1289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1991). However, the court intermixed the
jurisdictional and discretionary aspects of the Declaratory Judgment Act in upholding the
district court's judgment of dismissal. See Intermedics, 1993 WL 87405, at *4 (“For
these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining not to exercise
its declaratory judgment jurisdiction for failure to meet the actual controversy
requirement of [the Declaratory Judgment Act].”); compare Telectronics Pacing Sys.,
Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that patentee's
declaratory judgment action against accused infringer's pre-FDA approval-stage device
could not be maintained on the grounds that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction to
hear it, and (2) dismissal in the exercise of discretion was appropriate).

119

See, e.g., Agridyne, 863 F. Supp. at 1527 n.6 (distinguishing between constitutional
and policy bases for its determination of justiciability, but noting that the case's outcome
would be the same under either analysis).

120

The trial court's rationale for its justiciability determination may affect the ultimate
result if the aggrieved party appeals, because it determines the standard of review. A
district court's decision on whether jurisdiction exists on particular facts is a question of
law, reviewable de novo. BP Chem., 4 F.3d at 978 (citing Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 888). In
contrast, a discretionary declination of jurisdiction is reviewed pursuant to the more
deferential “abuse of discretion” standard. See Capo, 387 F.3d at 1354 (citing Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995)). In either event, the court's findings with
respect to the underlying facts are reviewed for clear error pursuant to Federal Rule Of
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judgment claimant in the same position as a decision that the ongoing discussions
between the parties serve as an appropriate basis for declining to exercise jurisdiction –
out of court. Nevertheless, it is important that courts carefully distinguish between the
two justiciability rationales in patent cases.
For one thing, the basis for the district court’s justiciability decision determines
the standard of review on appeal.121 Also, the Act on its face precludes the inclusion of
prudential factors in the jurisdictional calculus, as the language of Congress made distinct
the Act’s jurisdictional and discretionary aspects.122 Litigants are entitled to have the
statute applied as Congress intended.
Furthermore, to the extent that the courts inconsistently assign jurisdictional
versus prudential weight to the same or similar facts in declaratory judgment justiciability
determinations, outcomes are less predictable. As a result, some potential infringers may
be more inclined to initiate litigation rather than acquiesce to royalty demands, while
others, unable to justify the cost of potentially extensive motion practice on justiciability
on top of the costs and risks of litigating on the merits, may forego business
opportunities.
Most importantly, from the standpoint of maintaining a strong national patent
system, the courts are more likely to carefully evaluate the policy implications of
justiciability determinations when they are attentive to the distinction between the
jurisdictional and prudential bases for those decisions. Litigants, in turn, will be
motivated to provide courts with more careful analysis. The likely results include the
development of better policy and improved judicial decisionmaking.
The Federal Circuit’s tendency to decide declaratory judgment justiciability issues
on jurisdictional grounds even where the facts more appropriately implicate policy may
be attributable to any of several motivations. The court was created to standardize and
stabilize national patent law123 and to restore confidence in the United States patent

Civil Procedure 52(a). BP Chem., 4 F.3d at 978 (citing Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735).
Accordingly, a decision dismissing a declaratory judgment claim as a matter of discretion
is less subject to reversal on appeal than one made on the same facts but based on the
ground that one or both of the jurisdictional prongs has not been met.
121

See Capo, 387 F.3d at 1354.
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See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.

123

See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 4 (1981) (“The creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit provides . . . a forum for appeals from throughout the country in areas of
the law where Congress determines that there is special need for . . . uniformity.”); see
also Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

30

system.124 By discouraging decisions on prudential grounds, the Federal Circuit’s
approach tends to shield patentees against declaratory judgment attack. It also cultivates
district court decisions subject to plenary review, giving the Federal Circuit greater
jurisprudential control. Furthermore, deciding cases on legal, as opposed to
discretionary, grounds is more likely to shield judges from criticisms of judicial activism.
Additionally, to the extent justiciability determinations are made and sustained on
constitutional grounds, Congress’ ability to provide declaratory judgment claimants with
greater access to the courts is constrained.125
Restricting access to the declaratory judgment remedy in patent cases can be
justified on many grounds. For example, readily subjecting patents to declaratory
judgment attack would tend to undermine the respect the Federal Circuit was created to
engender, for a patent’s vitality is in question and potentially impaired any time it is
involved in litigation. Furthermore, a restrictive justiciability approach also encourages
competitors to allocate resources away from litigation and toward meaningful “designaround” efforts, stimulating innovation that benefits the public as well as the innovator.126
It also encourages dispute resolution via negotiation by placing the litigation alternative
effectively out of reach until after negotiations have clearly broken down,127 and, to that
extent, reduces the incidence of litigation, with all the attendant benefits.
124

See, e.g., Jon F. Merz & Nicholas M. Pace, Trends in Patent Litigation: The Apparent
Influence of Strengthened Patents Attributable to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 76 J. PAT. & TM. OFF. SOC. 579, 579 (1994) (noting the court's progress toward
meeting the goal of promoting predictability).
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Although Congress cannot affect constitutional jurisdictional limits, it can change or
abrogate prudential limitations. See, e.g., United Food & Comm. Workers Union Local
751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551 (1996).
126

As the Federal Circuit has observed, designing around patents is socially desirable
activity:
Designing around patents is . . . one of the ways in which
the patent system works to the advantage of the public in
promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional
purpose. Inherent in our claim-based system is also the
principle that the protected invention is what the claims say
it is, and thus that infringement can be avoided by avoiding
the language of the claims.
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

127

See, e.g., Phillips Plastics Corp., 57 F.3d at 1053 (holding that a patentee's statement
that declaratory judgment plaintiff's products were “covered by” its patent did not give
rise to an actual controversy because the patentee had also offered a license; stating that
“[w]hen there are proposed or ongoing license negotiations, a litigation controversy
31

Similarly, the courts’ reluctance to entertain declaratory judgment claims, whether
brought by the potential infringer or the patentee, where there is a possibility that the
product at issue may change in the future, has some merit. To the extent that a product
under development may undergo modifications relevant to the question of infringement
before being introduced into the marketplace, there is a risk that resources – those of the
court and of the parties – invested in determining patent coverage may be wasted.
Additionally, it may be difficult or impossible to determine whether a declaration of
infringement or noninfringement is appropriate in circumstances where the product does
not yet exist.128 In such circumstances, the risk of erroneous infringement determinations
is likely higher.129
These concerns, however, do not justify refraining from issuing declaratory
judgments regarding infringement in every case. Manufacturers frequently modify
products even after they are built, introduced, and sold. If the potential for change
justified declining to decide infringement, justiciable patent cases would be rare. In
addition, patent infringement determinations often must be made without the court’s or
jury’s examination of the actual accused device. For example, where the size or nature of
the product precludes its examination in court, surrogates such as drawings, diagrams,

normally does not arise until the negotiations have broken down”); Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at
889 (affirming dismissal of accused infringer's declaratory judgment action where
patentee's statements that the accused infringer's activities “‘fall within,’ are ‘covered by,’
and are ‘operations under’” the patentee's patent were made during license negotiations
initiated by the accused, noting that “[i]t is possible that, even after the conversations
reached an impasse, [the patentee] might never have sued”); Century Indus., Inc. v.
Wenger Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1260, 1264-65 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (dismissing alleged
infringer's declaratory judgment claim in part because the parties were “still engaged in
discussions aimed at resolving the potential dispute as late as” a week before suit was
initiated). Compare Océ-Office Systems, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 805 F. Supp. 642,
647 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (denying patentee's motion to dismiss accused infringer's declaratory
claim where the parties' licensing negotiations “had failed”).
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See, e.g., Lynn C. Tyler, Injunctions Against Threatened Patent Infringement: Were
Lang Pacific Marine and Its Progeny Wrongly Decided?, 4 FED. CIR. B.J. 113, 133-34
(1994) (citing decisions refusing to grant injunctions against threatened infringement on
the ground that the product is not yet in existence).
129

See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory
Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 690 (1994) (factoring the risk of error attributable
to the “information deficit” that may characterize anticipatory adjudication into an
economic evaluation of the risks and benefits of, inter alia, declaratory judgment
determinations).
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and computer simulations are often employed in the product’s stead.130 And patent
attorneys routinely evaluate infringement and potential infringement based solely on
written and oral descriptions, diagrams, or drawings of the product or process at issue.131
Furthermore, many declaratory judgment claims seek adjudication of patent
validity or enforceability. Such determinations do not require an evaluation of any
potentially infringing products.
It is true that a critical step in determining validity or infringement is the step of
determining what the claim language means.132 Furthermore, patent claims are construed
the same way for all purposes,133 and the court’s decision on claim construction will, as a
legal or practical matter, often resolve the question of infringement.134 Without a doubt,
therefore, attorneys and litigants often prefer to develop their positions on claim
construction with the potentially infringing product in mind. And claim construction
determinations may, similarly and appropriately, be informed by the court’s
understanding of the product at issue. Nevertheless, because correct validity
determinations can be made without the potentially infringing product, and the cases
demonstrate that litigants are sometimes willing to obtain binding validity, enforceability,
or even infringement determinations before development or construction of the
potentially infringing product or process is complete, the courts should not, as a matter of
law, refuse to adjudicate declaratory judgment claims in such circumstances.
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See id. at 134 (commenting on the use of manufacturing drawings in infringement
determination).
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Virtually every legal or equitable issue that can arise in a patent matter turns on the
language of the patent claims at issue. As a result, attorneys, judges, and litigants are
very accustomed to making patent-related evaluations based on textual and diagrammatic
descriptions alone.
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See, e.g., SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The first step in any invalidity analysis is claim construction . . . .”);
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 874 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“A
determination of infringement involves a two-step analysis, the first step being to
properly construe the asserted claims.”).
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See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“[C]laims must be construed the same way for validity and for
infringement . . ..”).

134

See, e.g., Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“The court’s construction of the claims often decides the question of infringement,
whether literal infringement or under the doctrine of equivalents.”)

33

The decision on the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s refusal to
dismiss the defendant’s validity declaratory judgment counterclaim in Farmaceutisk
Laboratorium Ferring A/S v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,135 illustrates an appropriate
resolution where patent validity is challenged in the pre-infringement stage. The
plaintiff-patentee (“FLF”) sued the defendant (“Solvay”), asserting that Solvay’s
manufacture and distribution of a pharmaceutical product to physicians infringed FLF’s
patent.136 Solvay responded with a declaratory judgment counterclaim, requesting that
the court declare FLF’s patent invalid and not infringed.137 Solvay moved for summary
judgment on FLF’s infringement claims, relying on the experimental use “safe harbor”
defense to infringement found in 35 U.S.C. Section 271(e)(1).138 FLF then moved to
dismiss its infringement claims after learning through discovery that Solvay’s activities
were not actionable,139 and further to dismiss Solvay’s counterclaim on the ground that
dismissal of the infringement claims dissolved the actual controversy between the
parties.140
The court found that Solvay continued to possess a reasonable apprehension of
suit, because its existing immunity stemmed only from the fact that its product was still
undergoing testing required for federal Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
approval,141 and because FLF had demonstrated its intent to enforce its patent.142 The
court further found that Solvay had satisfied the “infringer activity” prong of the
jurisdiction test by showing “meaningful preparation” for potentially infringing
activity.143
135

25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
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Id. at 1346.
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Id.

138

Id.

139

Id. at 1347.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 1349. Although FLF had signed a “statement of non-liability as to [Solvay's]
past and current activities” and was willing to “stipulate non-liability as to future similar
activities,” the court held that Solvay's reasonable apprehension persisted because the
“future similar activities” covered only future testing activities, which were, in any event,
insulated by the Section 271(e)(1) safe harbor. Id. Solvay's clear intent was to market
the product commercially upon FDA approval. See id.

142

Id.

143

Id. at 1351.

34

Although determining that an actual controversy existed between the parties, the
Farmaceutisk Laboratorium court declined to adjudicate Solvay’s non-infringement
declaratory judgment claim, citing the possibility that the product could change.144
However, the court severed the non-infringement issue and permitted Solvay’s invalidity
claim to proceed.145
The court based its decision to sever on several factors. It noted that the “[u]nlike
the . . . product, the patent is a fixed target,” and that “[a] finding of invalidity would
settle the issue now, without requiring the wasting of additional resources.”146
Apparently anticipating or responding to concerns that the parties might attempt to take
inconsistent positions in separate validity and infringement trials, the court observed that
“any ruling concerning the patent claims will be binding on the parties in the future[,
which] . . . in turn will prevent FLF from winning both issues by arguing contrary
interpretations in severed judicial proceedings.”147
The court also discussed the policy considerations underlying its decision:
The practical effect of this ruling is to permit those who
seriously wish to practice an art facially preempted by a
patent to test the patent’s validity before completing the
arduous task of obtaining administrative approval without
requiring the court to participate in speculation as to the
potential infringement of a product whose final formulation
has not yet been settled. This position is supported by the
purposed and objectives of patent law in general.148
The court also recognized the effect a determination of non-justiciability would have on
Solvay:
In order to complete the project to the point of being able to
mass produce and market its product, Solvay will have
committed substantial resources in both time and money
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Id. at 1352. Specifically, the court cited Congress' intent to “protect patent holders'
rights, while encouraging improved products to enter the market and while fostering
competition to the maximum extent possible.” Id.
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. . .. Solvay . . . simply does not want to assume the
financial risk of pending litigation years down the road
after having expended significant additional resources on
the project.149
As noted above, the Farmaceutisk Laboratorium court relied on its discretionary
authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act in severing the issues of infringement and
validity.150 In explaining its decision, it expressly noted the role judicial discretion
should play in determining which circumstances justify the adjudication of a declaratory
judgment claim.151 The court’s attentiveness to the distinction between jurisdictional and
discretionary considerations in determining justiciability in patent cases, and its
recognition of the role discretion should play in distinguishing between the justiciable
and the non-justiciable, is commendable.
Farmaceutisk Laboratorium originated as a patentee’s infringement action,152 and
the court spoke specifically of the plight of the drug manufacturer as subject to the
uncertainty associated with the FDA approval process.153 Different circumstances may
well justify a different outcome. Yet the court’s approach to evaluating justiciability in
patent cases can advantageously be applied in other circumstances.154 When, for
example, the action is initiated by the potential infringer, the court must determine that it
has jurisdictional authority to hear the plaintiff’s claim(s), using the “reasonable
apprehension/infringer activity” test discussed above before it evaluates whether that
jurisdiction ought to be exercised under the particular circumstances of the case.
Assuming that the potential infringer has demonstrated its intent to engage in potentially
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infringing activity by making “meaningful preparations,”155 and has (and has pled) a
good faith basis for challenging the validity and/or enforceability of the patent, the court
should not regard the fact that the product or process in question is not complete and on
the market as depriving it of jurisdiction to adjudicate at least validity and
enforceability.156 The court should, of course, evaluate whether, on the circumstances of
a particular case, an exercise of its jurisdiction is appropriate.
For example, the fact that the product in question in Farmaceutisk Laboratorium
was a pharmaceutical product subject to FDA approval appropriately informed the
court’s decision to exercise its jurisdiction only to the point of adjudicating validity.157
The potential infringer had a good faith basis for challenging the patent’s validity.158
However, at a time when nearly 40% of district court patent claim construction decisions
are overturned by the Federal Circuit,159 it is clear that even the most reasonable, wellfounded basis for a party’s position on validity is no guarantee of success in litigation.160
Under such circumstances, the court in Farmaceutisk Laboratorium was appropriately
concerned that the potential infringer would invest significant effort and expense, above
and beyond that which it had already invested, completing FDA-required clinical trials,
all the while laboring under the uncertainty that it might be enjoined when it completed
the development and approval process.161 The court’s rationale in this regard applies
with equal force to other development ventures requiring significant resources.
New product development always entails investment and risk. But the risks a
party assumes in proceeding with product development while aware of a potentially
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See, e.g., Christian Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim
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applicable patent are considerable. U.S. patents are presumptively valid,162 and a
challenger must demonstrate invalidity or unenforceability with clear and convincing
evidence to overcome that presumption.163 Regardless of the reasonableness of its
defenses, it is subject to damages164 and injunctive relief upon a finding of
infringement.165 If a court determines that the infringement defendant did not exercise
due care to avoid infringement, the court may award enhanced damages of up to three
times the actual damages.166 Furthermore, the same determination can lead the court to
declare the case “exceptional,” and award the patentee its reasonable attorney fees.167
These realities should always factor into a court’s decision to exercise or decline to
exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the courts have often proclaimed the public policy of preventing
owners of invalid patents from exercising monopoly power.168 In evaluating the
justiciability of declaratory judgment claims in patent cases, the courts should keep in
mind that an invalid patent ought to have absolutely no effect–not even the effect of
discouraging, in combination with the uncertainties associated with patent litigation, the
investment by others in what are, in actuality, public domain activities. To the extent a
holder of an invalid patent can discourage such investment, or extract what amounts to
ransom in the form of unfounded settlements, such patents are, in fact, given effect.

162

35 U.S.C. § 282.

163
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The extra-judicial resolution of business disputes doubtlessly ought to be
encouraged, and such resolutions must remain available for those who desire them, or are
obligated to pursue them by fiduciary duties owed, for example, to corporate
shareholders. However, the Declaratory Judgment Act was enacted to provide parties an
alternative vehicle for resolving disputes. While courts may appropriately employ the
discretion afforded by the Act to encourage business resolutions, patent owners ought not
be able to force such resolutions on parties for whose benefit the Act was enacted.
Furthermore, parties engaged in product development are not the only ones who
bear the costs even a putatively invalid patent impose. To the extent the developer
passes its costs on–costs in the form, for example, of negotiating and paying unwarranted
royalties, investing in unnecessary efforts to design around the patent, purchasing
insurance to cover infringement risks, potentially squandering resources on developing
the product in question to the point the courts will consider sufficient “meaningful
preparation” to support a declaratory judgment controversy, and obtaining legal opinions
to protect itself from a finding of willful infringement–its customers, shareholders, and
business partners pay as well. And to the extent the developer elects not to make these
investments, the public at large pays in the form of potentially higher costs to use
patented technology, and lack of access to any improved or alternative technologies the
developer would have produced had it not elected to forgo its opportunities.
But whether or not applying a more analytically sound approach to determining
justiciability results in greater access to the declaratory judgment remedy for putative
patent infringers, it will engender more careful analysis by courts and litigants and greater
outcome predictability.
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